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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
LABOR LAW-UNION UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE-PICKETING AFTER
LOSING REPRESENTATION ELECTION. -The National Labor Relations

Board has recently been presented with conflicting recommendations by its trial examiners regarding the validity of union picketing after the union has lost a representation election. In Shepherd
Machinery Co., Case No. 21-CB-805, the trial examiner concluded
that such picketing was an unfair labor practice because its
purpose was to coerce and restrain the employees of the company.
However, an opposite conclusion was reached in Curtis Brothers,
Inc., Case No. 5-CB-190, where the trial examiner recommended
that the complaint against the union be dismissed. Apparently,
this is the first instance in which the Board has been called upon to
answer the narrow question whether picketing after the loss of an
election is violative of section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A) (1952).
It was reasoned in Shepherd that since the employees involved
had repudiated the union at the polls, the purpose of the picketing
was not to inform the public of a labor dispute but to force the
employer, by economic pressure, to accede to union demands.
The trial examiner found that by these tactics the union had in
effect coerced the employees and thereby violated section 8 (b)
(1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act. This section makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents "to restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in
Section 7 [Taft-Hartley Act] ....

."

Section 7 not only provides

for the right of self-organization, but also protects "the right to
refrain from any or all such activities" except where there is a
lawful union shop contract. See 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
157 (1952). The examiner pointed out further that there would
be no interference with free speech if this picketing were restrained. This observation was based on a series of Supreme Court
cases holding picketing to be something more than free speech
and capable of being enjoined when conducted for unlawful
purposes. Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950);
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470
(1950); Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460
(1950); Gibboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949).
The opposite recommendation in Curtis was based primarily
on the legislative history of section 8 (b) (1) (A) as set forth in
National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), but emphasis
(724)
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was also placed on PerryNorvel Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948), which
held that a minority strike did not "restrain or coerce" the employees in violation of this section. Here the trial examiner considered the Supreme Court decisions, supra, "inapposite."
It makes little difference in this problem area whether the
picketing is labeled as organizational or recognitional, for the
significant determinant is whether the picketing "restrains and
coerces," and is thereby unlawful. Nevertheless, the courts and
the Board continue to make this meaningless distinction. The
picketing in the instant cases is best classified as recognitional
since that is the more inclusive term. The only purpose
of continued picketing after failure to organize the employees is
to gain recognition of the union by putting economic pressure on
the employers and, indirectly, the employees.
In one of the earliest cases involving section 8 (b) (1) (A) the
Board indicated that it applied only to violence or threats of
violence. National Maritime Union, supra. The Board relied on
the section's legislative history as it quoted extensively from
congressional reports. A later case actually involving recognitional picketing followed this historical analysis and found there was
no violation of section (8) (b) (1) (A). In the Matter of Local 74,
80 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948). See also Perry Norvell Co., supra. The
Board felt that Congress intended to outlaw the coercive conduct
which accompanies a strike, but not the strike itself, thus implying that coercive picketing could violate section 8 (b) (1) (A)
even during a lawful strike.
However, the Board has turned away from the doctrine of
National Maritime Union, supra, and has found violations of
section 8 (b) (1) (A) where the union attempted to force an employer, through picketing, to discharge employees in violation of
section (8)

(a)

(3). "....

The reason for it [the discharge] would

inevitably become known to the other employees, and would
coerce and restrain them.... " Clara-ValPacking Co., 87 N.L.R.B.
703, 705 (1949). See Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, 90
N.L.R.B. 205 (1950).
The Taft-Hartley Act specifically provides in section 9 (c) that
the results of a Board-conducted election shall be valid and
binding for a period of one year. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
159 (c) (1952). Although the Second Circuit has said, "We are
not prepared to hold that all post-certification picketing is forbidden," Douds v. Local 150, Bakery & Confectionery Workers
Union, 224 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1955), it seems that this activity
would be protected only in rare circumstances where it was
conducted for the sole purpose of informing the public of a labor
dispute. In this situation, the picketing can be analogized to "free
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speech" which is protected by section 8 (c) of the Act. 61 STAT. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (c) (1952).
Since mere persuasion without violence by union agents has
been held to violate section 8 (b) (1) (A), NLRB v. Newspaper
& Mail Delivers' Union, 192 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1951), the Board
should have little difficulty in finding recognitional picketing,
which is one of labor's most forceful weapons, a violation of this
section when its purpose and effect is to coerce and restrain employees in the exercise of their rights under section 7. Clearly,
the economic incidents of such picketing may force the employer
to pressure his employees into joining the union when in fact the
employees may desire to join another union or refrain from
joining any union whatsoever.
Since the Board has received conflicting recommendations from
its trial examiners, it now has the opportunity to restate the law
concerning post-election picketing. The semantic distinction adhered to in the past should be disregarded. This type of picketing
should be recognized for what it is-an unlawful activity. To
permit unions to harass employer and employees after the latter
have indicated a desire not to be represented by a particular union
is to dissipate the effect of the Board's representation elections.
Ray F. Drexler

